A Search for Basic Universal Morality

- By Saral Jhingran*

Abstract

There are immense differences between human beings- cultural, linguistic, religious, and even moral. But there are equally immense affinities between man and man in their physical, social, and psychological needs. In order to fulfil those needs, we require a morality that can help humans realize their potential for being virtuous and create a society that can make this possible. While cultural and ethical relativists insist upon the uniqueness and closed character of various cultures and their moralities, a large number of ethicists, from Sidgwick, Kant, and Hume to contemporary ones like Baier, Stace, Nielsen, Williams, and Nagel, argue for a basic universal morality which is applicable to all human beings and would lead to the general welfare of all. | agree with the latter view and am trying to argue for the possibility of such a morality. My main contention is that there is basic equality, an affinity between and interdependence of all human beings, recognition of which would naturally inspire a core universal morality. I find support for my views on some aspects of Indian philosophy, including medieval Bhakti saints and Mahatma Gandhi.

Introduction

I. 1. What IS MORALITY? I cannot add anything new to what so many ethicists have been saying. But to keep our discussion clear, let me repeat what I mean by morality. Morality or ethics is that branch of human thinking that tells us what the right course of conduct is and the right goal (good) that we should seek through our conduct.

In other words, morality or ethics is the discipline that tells us what to do and what to’ be.’¹ Morality consists of some fundamental/foundational moral principles which are universal; that is, apply to all human beings in similar circumstances; or preferably which must apply to all human beings in almost all circumstances, not only in like circumstances only, like prohibition of killing or torturing some innocent person, especially a child. It means that cultural and temporal differences would not count in applying these universal moral principles.

I. 2. Moralities vs. Universal Morality: There are immense differences among human beings—cultural, religious, linguistic, and even moral. Differences being more striking, we recognize them more easily than the similarities in human nature. My main contention is that in as much as all human beings are intrinsically akin to each other in their needs, desires, and responses to life situations, there must be some ethical imperatives that in some way are based on human nature or its universal basic needs, and are therefore necessarily common to all cultures. I am asserting: First, the affinity between man and man, and their right to perfect equality of treatment. And second, a core universal morality that both apply to and aims at the good of all human beings alike. This universal morality does not deny the existence of different cultures and their customary moralities, but claims supremacy for itself in case of any conflict between the two. It also claims to judge the rightness or wrongness of various moralities.

Let us take even a cursory look at different moralities in various cultures. We will find that their age-old traditions have been responsible for immense suffering loss of freedom and dignity to a large section of the populace of that culture. Most of the imperatives of customary moralities generally go against minimum humanitarian beliefs and values of modern times. I firmly believe that if philosophers engage in serious dialogue, we can arrive at a rational conceptualization of the right moral point of view and certain moral tenets or imperatives which are shared by all or most rational and ‘humane’ persons, and which can tell us what to do, or what to be ourselves.

But in order even to attempt to enter into dialogue with various points of view in morality we would have first to confront the uncompromising cultural relativists of the Continent who declare the impossibility of even understanding other’s views, interests, and values.² But I disagree with their thesis—first and foremost because I have an intuitive faith in the affinity of different peoples sharing the same humanity. Second, their claim that culture is an integrated and homogeneous whole falsifies any culture’s complexity, multi-dimensionality, and dynamic nature. No culture is a homogeneous whole; no culture is a fossilized one or an enclosed entity. And third, the entire history of humanity provides evidence of different people, including pre-historic ones, traveling to far-off lands, trading and communicating with people speaking different languages, practising very different customs and mores, and learning from them. There is constant mutual communication, understanding, and give and take between various people, and each culture is constantly changing or remoulding itself due to outer influences and inner tensions.

My main emphasis is on the truth of inherent equality of and essential affinity between all human beings. Torture and, of course, loss of life, or even some life-threatening deception, are unpleasant to us as much as they are so to people inhabiting other very different cultures. If so, the prohibition against them should be right for all cultures. And such prohibitions and some positive injunctions in accordance with the needs of our common humanity make up what I call universal morality. W.T. Stace contends that we mean by a universal morality:

A moral principle which is applicable to all men in the sense that, even if they do not accept it, they ought to do so. [...] We have to show that what really is right is the same for all men. We do not have to show that what men think right is everywhere the same.³

I am trying to argue that some fundamental principles of morality are independent of differences in cultures and individual idiosyncrasies. If human life has value so that destroying it is morally wrong, then it is so whether one is killing or destroying human lives in Iraq or India. If suffering is evil and undesirable to us, then causing suffering to human beings is an immoral act everywhere. If keeping one’s promise or speaking truth is an important virtue in one society, it must be so in all others, as its opposite would destroy the socio-moral fabric of mutual trust in every society.

When faced with the differences in the (mostly customary) moralities, we would have to distinguish between fundamental universal moral principles and the culturally conditioned moral rules that apply to those circumstances or institutions alone. This is a distinction between what I would call the essence and the peripheral rules of morality.

II. Can There be Some Universal, Basic Common Morality?

II. 1. Classical Utilitarians stressed the importance of consequences of any action, which was conceived as ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number.’ Of course, such an idea creates problems, but as affirmed by Bentham, the general idea is a worthwhile contribution to morality. It is, ‘each man is to count for one, and no one is to count for more than one.’ Henry Sidgwick asserted that from the Universe's point of view, there is no difference between the happiness of one person and that of the other.⁴ All these assertions affirm the perfect equality of every man and woman. Thus utilitarianism is a theory that extols every effort to achieve the greatest welfare of all human beings, and since in any given circumstances, we cannot achieve that grand and rather abstract goal, we should try to achieve as much happiness or welfare of as many people as we can.

As against the Utilitarians, Deontologists believe that the moral worth of an action is not derived from the end or consequences thereof but from its being in accordance with the moral law, that is, the rightness of an action. According to Immanuel Kant, not the consequences of any action but the moral principle by which the given action is directed decide its moral worth.⁵ The Bhagavad Gita’s main message is that — an agent has only the right to do her duty, not to the consequences that may depend on many external circumstances beyond the agent's control.⁶ Kantian principle of respecting every human being as a person in her own right, so that she cannot be made a means of another resembles closely the early utilitarian principle of ‘every one is to count for one and no one is to count for more than one’. By this, they all meant that no one who judges himself as ‘more than one’ can make another a means of his interests. Both Kantian and utilitarian principles thus express the ideal of perfect notional equality of all human beings before the law and in our interpersonal dealings. R. M. Hare has rightly observed that the universalizability principle of deontologists and rationalists, and utilitarians’ emphasis on welfare (happiness) of maximum possible number of people implying the absolute equality of all human beings and their welfare, are the same.”⁷

II. 2 Kant has long back declared that we human beings are inter-related since God has sent us to live in one dwelling place to help each other.⁸ Hare has argued in great detail that in any moral deliberation, the interests of all others should be considered as equal to our own. But why should we do so? Hare contends that all human beings’ basic interests and inclinations are the same. To understand them, we need imagination; and he goes on giving his famous example of someone wanting to send his debtor to prison; but if only he could imagine how he himself would feel in that situation, he would immediately desist from his intended action because he has realized that basically the needs and inclinations of all men are the same. Hare derives the principle of total equality from his prior commitment to the law of universalizability.⁹ He also makes a very important observation here. According to him, universalizability of moral judgments implies their prescriptivism; that is, any moral law, in so far as it applies to everyone, must be obeyed by all, including the subject. He clarifies that if someone affirms a moral imperative but does not intend to act accordingly, she contradicts herself.¹⁰ Kurt Baier, says that ‘all moral rules must be — first, applicable to everyone; and second, must be for the good of everyone.¹¹ It means that universalizability of all moral judgments, so important for deontologists, and conduciveness to the good of all, the central thesis of utilitarians, and equally recognized by modern Kantian thinkers as Kurt Baier and Kai Nielsen, are not contradictory but can be seen as complementary and combined in a more comprehensive rational moral thesis.

Kai Nielsen endorses this view. Here Nielsen gives a valuable suggestion that though the principle of universalizability is very important for ethical judgments, as it is for every other rational argument, it is the principle of utility or the greatest good of human beings that alone can provide a test of the truth or validity of any moral rule or judgment. He explains that if we want to decide whether certain rules, actions or practices are good or bad (moral or not), we have to decide whether’ they are [...] in the best interests of everyone, and in talking about the best interests of everyone, we are talking about their most extensive welfare and well-being.’ And ‘if they cannot be for the good of everyone alike they could not be compatible with the moral point of view.¹² He asserts that any kind of empirical differences cannot justify differentiation of treatment; rather,

...from the point of view of morality, men are simply to be counted as men.
As
members of human species, they have a prima facie right to equal treatment.¹³

In normal life, and everyday moral dilemmas, the deontologist and the utilitarian principle of the worth of everyone counting the same, so that the moral agent cannot make an exception of oneself, or make others a means of his/her interests, is the most valuable criterion for judging an action or character morally. If the decision to act in a certain manner has been taken in a disinterested manner, that is, without any reference to one’s selfish interests and personal bias, it would be a right moral judgment.

Bernard Williams contradicts the early utilitarians’ contention of the end of moral action being the greatest happiness (welfare) of the greatest number. He argues that we also have obligations towards our family and friends; neglecting them would be equally blame-worthy. But Thomas Nagel has convincingly countered Williams’ contention, saying that in morality, we have to look for the welfare of all human beings as much as is practically possible, meaning that we can not make any exceptions for our family or friends.¹⁴ Actually, Williams does not always stick to his view and contends that:

...there are some ethical demands that seem to be satisfied only by a universal concern, one that extends to all human beings, and perhaps beyond the human race.¹⁵

He adds that ‘For morality, ethical constituency is always the same, universal constituency.¹⁶ The basic thesis of all these philosophers belonging to very different ethical schools, from Bentham, Sidgwick, and Hume on the one hand and Kant and most contemporary Kantian or rationalist thinkers, such as Bair, Stace, and Nielsen, is one— the innate similarity and equality of all human beings. It follows that there is no rational basis for discrimination between different humans, including oneself.

Mahatma Gandhi insisted that the welfare of entire humanity is his goal, and of them most important is the welfare and uplifting of the downtrodden. He kept the latter as his first priority, much ahead of the national goal of Independence. To quote him:

Man’s ultimate aim is to realize God [....] The immediate service of all
Human
beings becomes a necessary part of endeavour simply because the only
way to
find God is to see Him in His creation, and be one with it. This can be
done by
service of all.¹⁷

Significantly, he transformed the Vedantic vision of one Self (Atman) in all, which the ancient Upanishadic seers understood only at a rational level (perhaps not applicable to practical life) into a useful way of life. Gandhi simply contended that if the same God resides in all humans, there is left no basis of discrimination between man and man. If so, mistreatment of ‘lower’ castes whom he called Harijans (children of God) is both immoral and against the religious vision of one God in all. To quote him:

I am endeavouring to see God through the service of humanity, for I
know that
God is neither in heaven, nor down below, but in every one. [...]
I am a part and parcel of the whole, and I cannot find Him apart from the
rest of
humanity.¹⁸
I recognize no God except the God that is to be found in the hearts of the
Dumb
millions. [...] I worship the God that is Truth through the service of these
millions.¹⁹

We may not like to use the concept of God to justify the obligations of morality. But I find that basic philosophical tenet of innate similarity and equality of all human beings and an honest recognition of some profounder aspect of human self give natural incentive for being moral. And being moral means helping the downtrodden and sharing the lot of others as much as we can.

II. 3. A related problem, which has indirectly been discussed by utilitarians, and more fully discussed by Kant, would be whether the intention of the moral agent is more important in judging the moral worth of the action, or its consequences are more so. For the deontologist, the intention of the moral agent is very important, as it determines the moral merit or demerit of the agent. Except Kant, all other deontologists, such as W.D Ross and Henry Prichard recognize the need to consider both the circumstances and the possible consequences of our contemplated action, though the worth of intention or motive remains equally important. Ross contends that every moral judgment contains prior deliberation of the demands of the circumstances, the possible consequences of the contemplated action, as well as the relevant prima facie duty (recognized by intuition). But once all this is done, our duty sans phrase is definite and recognized by our intuition.²⁰ On the other hand, for contemporary consequentialists and ethicists like Bernard Gert, the outcome or consequences of our actions are alone important in judging the moral worth of an action or conduct of some person and not the intention.²¹ Now, suppose a politician does some good work for the public, but his intention is only to win their votes in the forthcoming elections. For the deontologist, his insincerity and using the gratitude of the masses as a means of winning elections means the loss of any moral merit. But for the consequentialist, his actions have all the moral worth. Even so, good intentions alone are not sufficient. They must be accompanied by careful consideration of which course of action would most likely bring the right desirable results. This has happened in the case of Christian missionaries who went to far-off tribes with the pious intention of ‘saving their souls’ but have in the process destroyed whole tribes by the infections they were inadvertently carrying and the tribes not being immune to them.

II. 4. Another related question is whether the goal of any action alone has moral worth or the rightness of the means is more important. In Western philosophy, this issue is not much discussed except by the consequentialists who try to argue by giving fantastic examples that consequences alone are important, whatever the means. Revolutionaries, Marxists, and others have had idealist goals, and violence has been their preferred means, as for them, means do not matter.

Here Mahatma Gandhi's views again are very relevant. He rejected any violent means to gain India’s Independence, and insisted on total non-violence as the guiding and determining principle of struggle for freedom. It was so because Gandhi believed:

Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind.[...] Every
murder or
other injury, no matter for what cause, committed or inflicted on another
is a
crime against humanity.²²

He called his non-violence the way of the brave and explained that only those willing to undergo suffering could take up the way of non-violence. He contended that non-violence or ahimsa is a virtue to be practised both at a personal level and in interpersonal relations in the society. Gandhi named the way of non-violence as Satyagraha-the endeavour to realize the Truth, or any other morally justified goal, as India’s Freedom. There was no place for violence or hatred against the opposite party in Satyagraha. And so Indians made a unique experiment in their struggle for Independence by non-violent means in which many of them made great sacrifices (like leaving their educational institutes, and more, leaving their jobs). They went to prison for long years got beaten or killed, but none of them were killed in retaliation (except for a few failed revolutionaries). Perhaps the Mahatma’s conceptualization of ahimsa was a little too difficult and too idealistic, but his way of ahimsa shines like a beacon of light in the present global darkness of mutual hatred and violence.

III. The Source and Authority of Moral Judgment

Several theories advocate some form or the other of inherent universally shared reason, moral sense, emotions, instinctive approval, or disapproval, which are claimed to signify to us the moral qualities of the object of our moral judgment. These various elements or faculties of our selves are claimed by their different proponents to be both the source and criterion of justification of the moral way of life that an individual or society adopts.

III. 1. Kant, of course, is the paradigmatic thinker advocating universal reason, shared by all normal (rational) persons, as the ultimate source and justification of moral laws. He believes that all differences of culture and times are irrelevant when we are talking of fundamental moral principles. These moral principles have their source both in the universal transcendental reason and our equally universally shared legislative will. Being thus declared by something within ourselves, they have spontaneous authority for us.²³ Post-Kantian advocates of the Good reasons approach, such as S.E. Toulmin, Kurt Baier, M.G. Singer, and Kai Nielsen, do not so much declare reason as the source of our moral principles and stress the role of reason in justifying them. These philosophers criticize the advocates of emotive and approbation theories. They point out that our saying that something has value, or some act is right does not depend upon the speaker’s pro or con attitude; rather, a person’s having a pro or con attitude towards something or some conduct is justified on the basis of her prior evaluation of that thing or act being good or right. This evaluation is, in turn, justified only when we can provide good reasons for it. They believe that in a unique way moral discourse is a cognitive activity. In the words of Nielsen, the post- Kantian rationalist ethicists believe: ‘that there is knowledge of good and evil, and that some moral claims have a perfectly respectable objectivity.²⁴ Any moral assertion can be justified by giving right or good reasons for our moral judgment. They further believe in the necessity of universality of any moral law or assertion, which they call universalizability. In all rational thinking, we can only make a valid moral assertion if applicable to all human beings, at least in similar circumstances.²⁵ Hare, Baier, and other rationalist ethicists have contended that a moral law should be such that it would be acceptable to any agent whether she is at the giving or receiving end of a given action. They call this condition reversibility; that is, any rule or judgment should be such that the object of the moral subject has an equal right to pay him/her back in the same terms.²⁶ Baier, Nielsen, and Nagel insist on every moral principle or rule being universally applicable and person-neutral or objective. It implies the total equality of all human beings. In the words of Thomas Nagel, in ethics we need to adopt a ‘A universal standpoint that does not distinguish between oneself and anyone else.’ Ethical principles, therefore must be such that apply to oneself as they apply to every one else.”²⁷

Importantly, all rationalist ethicists (except Kant) accept moral rules’ exceptions. They contend that if a situation is such that applying a given moral rule seems to be unjust or even immoral, then the original rule is modified (Hare), or some other moral law is applied in that situation (Stace and Taylor). But whatever law is applied, or an exception is justified, it must be universalizable. I would like to add that unless there is some vitally important reason to act otherwise, a moral law holds for all human beings alike. If killing or hurting any innocent person is morally wrong in a given society, then it is wrong in all societies, in at least most circumstances. Otherwise, moral thinking becomes some kind of existentialism or an arbitrary play with words.

However, reason can either turn into mere intellectual argumentation (seen in contemporary philosophical writings), which gives us no clue as to any moral criterion to judge our actions by; or becomes a continuous effort to give justification at every stage of moral reasoning, resulting in infinite regress, thus failing to offer some basic moral values / principles/ criteria to guide us in morally relevant situations. Therefore, reason alone cannot give us the most fundamental moral laws which would be applicable to all human beings, either as such or with the rider of similar circumstances.

In view of the difficulty in proving fundamental moral principles through reason, the ethicists of the Good reasons approach have not even tried to do that. Baier simply says that second-order moral principles (which he calls consideration-making beliefs) are major premises in any moral reasoning, while facts or circumstances are minor premises. He contends that the second-order principles or consideration-making beliefs are necessarily person-neutral, that is, they are prior to our giving any reason for any moral assertion (in an unspoken way—transcendental). He assumes that the major premises in any argument are the starting point that do not require any rational justification.²⁸ This is true in all rational arguments, including moral ones. If so, moral principles as major premises need not be further justified while they become the ground for other moral rules.

Ethicists Hare and Taylor have contended that once every moral principle is understood, as well as the relevant facts of the situation, final moral decision is the individual agent's as to which way of life or which moral principle one wants to adopt. Hare has argued that since moral argumentation cannot be carried on indefinitely, we have to tell our questioner that she would have to decide for herself what way of life she wants to lead.²⁹ Taylor, having developed in great detail the process of moral reasoning, says that finally we cannot decide as to which one of the several points of view is correct, that is, there cannot be any final justification of our moral contentions, and moral commitment is a person’s own.³⁰ He argues for tolerance of different points of view, without realizing that tolerance he is advocating seems to undermine the very justifiability and authority of morality.

I have a problem with this approach; it is that we are concerned here with general principles of morality applicable to every human being (of course, in like circumstances), and the personal decision does not come in the picture here, even though it is required at the personal level when one is trying to decide which course of action she should take, as clearly put forth by Ross.

Interestingly, while Kant declared universal moral reason as the source of fundamental moral laws, and found no need to justify them; later Kantian rationalists are almost exclusively concerned to justify moral laws or morality, but do not contend that reason alone is the source or foundation of moral laws. They rightly acknowledge that though we justify several moral rules and practices on the basis of some fundamental moral principles, the latter cannot be justified by reason alone. Though these ethicists do not always say this, it is mostly suggested or implied that these ultimate moral principles are in some unique way ‘given’ to us by our common nature. I fully agree.

Ill. 2. As against the rationalists’ assertion of some (transcendental?) reason common to the entire humanity, many philosophers have declared our emotional responses, generally called approval theories of either the individual or the society. Then some believe that one understands the moral principles or the rightness or wrongness of any action by one’s intuition. Not going into details, let me quote Butler, a pioneer of intuition theories:

There is a simple principle of reflection or conscience in every man. [...]
Which
pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just right,
good,
others to be in themselves wrong, evil, unjust; which without being
consulted{....] magisterially exerts itself and approves or condemns him.³¹

But individual's emotions, attitudes, or approval and disapproval cannot provide any source or basis of true and universal morality. However, Hume's theory of our natural sympathy, common to the entire mankind, which makes us approve or disapprove of any action on the basis of whether it leads to the good of human beings or not, is worth taking cognizance of. Hume believes that every heart tends to feel pleasure at the sight of ‘a noble and generous action;’ and feel abhorrence when confronted by some cruel and treacherous action.’ He concludes that ‘Morality therefore is more felt than judged.³² If he had said only this much, it would have meant an ordinary un-philosophical approbation theory, that is, there is no good or evil in actual life, only our emotions make it so; and emotions are notoriously multifarious and unreliable. But Hume says something far more profound. According to him, our approval or disapproval are not random; rather they are naturally governed by our realization that a given action is for the good of mankind, or against it. These emotions or emotional responses to actions or character are not culturally conditioned or mutually contradictory. Rather, they are a part of human psyche; and are universally shared. That is, if I am repulsed by the sight of some one’s cruelly torturing a hapless man, most other human beings would have the same reaction to that sight. Hume goes on to contend that our sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness are very real to us; and they are always favourable to virtue and unfavourable to vice. If so, nothing else is needed for us to differentiate between virtue and vice.³³

Hume also rightly observes that we can judge a character to be morally good or bad only if we consider that character independent of our personal interests. This is a very important suggestion because morality demands that we be free from our personal concerns. Hume is an advocate of approval theories, and approval or disapproval are notoriously relative and fortuitous. And yet he believes that the sentiment of morality is natural and therefore universal. Sympathy with our fellow beings is natural or inherent in us. Our approval or disapproval are directly related to the welfare of mankind.

To quote him:

These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper that
Without
entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness, it is
impossible
to extirpate or destroy them.³⁴

His faith in the universal presence of moral sentiments, which always support deeds done for the good of mankind, and disapprove any actions which may harm fellow human beings is not only unique, it gives us some hope for the future of humanity. Hume stresses the sentiment of sympathy for the entire humankind; also, this sympathy is present in all hearts. This sentiment of sympathy binds the entire human race to feel for the good or harm of the remotest people. Hume believes that sympathy is a very powerful sentiment in human nature, and it provides us our sentiment of morals. ‘Sympathy’, contends Hume, ‘which takes us so far from ourselves to give us the same pleasure or unease in the character of others as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss.’35 Hume said this two hundred years before Thomas Nagel proposed the need for self-transcendence for being moral. Very few philosophers have realized and asserted this as Hume has done. He believes that these sentiments are so universal that no nation, no individual, can be without them. He believes:

It cannot be denied without the greatest absurdity that there is some
Benevolence
howsoever small, infused in our bosoms, some spark of friendship for
humankind,
some particle of the dove along with the wolf and the serpent. Let these
generous
sentiments be supposed ever so weak, they must still direct the
determinations
of our minds [...] and produce a direct preference of what is useful and
serviceable
to mankind above what is pernicious and dangerous to mankind.”³⁵

The faith of Hume in the potential goodness of mankind is perhaps idealistic, and there are men whose cruelty and conduct contradict Hume's assertion that every man has sympathy and humanity. And yet, in spite of these exceptions, the rest of humankind does have some element of goodness, sympathy and compassion, which may be covered and overwhelmed by their stronger negative tendencies or basic self-interest. If someone just tries a little, the positive humanitarian elements can easily come to the fore and become a source and inspiration for moral behaviour. Thus Hume’s approbation theory is unique in its advocacy of universal morality.

Then there are social approval theories that believe that the society’s code is the right criterion of moral judgments. S. E. Toulmin seems to uphold some such theory when he says that the moral code of one’s society is the final criterion of judging one’s moral norms and conduct.³⁶ The real proponents of social approbation theories are some anthropologists and many postmodern relativists. They have argued for a strong ethical relativism, according to which whatever is believed and practised in one’s community is true and right for its members. This approach, as rightly pointed out by Paul W. Taylor, does not seem to make any distinction between what is believed and what is true, or what is practised and what is right.³⁷ It is a position to end all moral claims to be either true, universal, or overriding.

Therefore, it is not acceptable to us as a participant in the moral discourse.

III. 3. The worth of intuition, or an intuitive perception of what is the right course of action in a given situation, cannot be denied. Some of our intuitions (which can be understood as instinctive disapproval) as an aversion to killing or torturing innocent people, especially children, cheating or hurting the poor, not heeding the cries of help by someone in dire need of it, etc. are both true and universal. However, our intuitions often differ due to various sociological and psychological reasons.

As we have seen above, though very important, reason alone cannot be both the source and criterion of judgment in the universal morality that we seek to justify. To acknowledge ultimate ethical principles, experience, intuition, sympathetic imagination, or sensitive conscience are also needed. If we suffer in a certain situation, we accept that such suffering is terrible; and a spontaneous moral rule emerges that such suffering must not be meted out to any human being. For that, sympathetic imagination is required. Generally, it is intuition that endorses these basic universal moral rules. Reason and intuition must work together. The subjective approval or even reasoning can count only for personal decisions; it cannot finally justify any moral rule or principle. Ultimate moral principles have to be recognized and decided by reason and intuition working together. Often, we do so without being aware of it.

Notes and References:

1. Kai Nielsen, Why be Moral?, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1989), p.42.
2. For critical discussion of cultural relativism, please see Saral Jhingran, Ethical Relativism and Universalism, 2001, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Chs. I. to III.
3. W.T. Stace, The Concept of Morals, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), pp. 88-89, 98, 102 ff.
4. H. Sidgwick, “Methods of Ethics” in W.T. Jones, Frederick Sontag, Morton O. Beckner, and Robert J. Fogelin, Approaches to Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977)
5. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr, Thomas K Abbott & Marvin Fox (New York: Boobs-Merril co., 9th Reprint , 1949) p. 17.
6. Bhagwad Gita, 1147, tr., S Radhakrishan, (Bombay, Blackie & Sons, 1977).
7. ‘Men should be considered fellow-men, that is rational men with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place for the purpose of helping one another.’ The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Mary J. Gregor, reprint, 1964, pp.121 and 117 ff.
8. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason,(London: Oxford University Press,1963), pp. 108 ff., 122 ff.
9. Ibid, pp .33 ff, 52 ff, 73 ff, 90.
10. Ibid, pp. 134 ff.
11. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, 1967, (New York: Random House, 1967), pp.84 ff.,106 -108.
12. Kai Nielsen, 1989, op. cit., pp. 42, 95.
13. Kai Nielsen,1989, op. cit., pp. 114—117.
14. Thomas Nagel, View From Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 198-199.
15. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (London: Collins, 1985), p. 14.
16. Ibid, p. 14.
17. M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, 29.8.1936, given in. The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, eds, RK. Prabhu & U.R. Rao, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publ., 1966 ), p. 224.
18. MK. Gandhi, Young India, 6. 8. 1925, p. 52.
19. MK. Gandhi, Young India, 4.8. 1927; Harijan, 14, 5.1928, p. 53
20. W. D. Ross, “Ptima Facie Duties,” from The Right and the Good, given in Taylor, The Problems of Moral Philosophy, (California: Dickenson Publishing, 1962 ), pp. 266 ff., 272-273.
21. Bernard Gert, Morality Its Nature and Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 25-27.
22. M. K. Gandhi, Young India and Harijan, several similar quotes in Prabhu & Rao, 1966, op. cit, pp.112 ff., 122 ff.
23. Kant, 1949, op. cit, pp. 45-48.
24. Kai Nielsen, “Some Recent Views,” in “Ethics, History of,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 3,( 1972), pp. 110-111.
25. “The Supreme principle of the application of moral rules is that in the absence of morally relevant differences between people, moral rules must be applied to every one alike.’ Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, op. cit., pp. 100, 109; Also, Baier, “The Point of View of Morality” in Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory, eds., Kenneth Pahel and Marvin Schiller, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 100 ff.
26. Baier, 1967, op.cit., pp. 29 ff; 34 ff; 108.
27. Nagel, 1986, op. cit., p. 177.
28. Baier, 1967, op. cit., p. 82 ff.
29. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, (London: Oxford University Press,1952), pp.69 ff.
30. Paul W. Taylor, The Normative Discourse, (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1961), pp. 318 ff., 330.
31. Quoted in W.D. Hudson, Ethical Intuitionism, (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 29.
32. David Hume, “Of Virtue and Vice in General” in W.T. Jones et al., 1977, op.cit., pp. 262-264.
33. Ibid, p. 266
34. Ibid, pp 268-269.
35. David Hume, “Moral Distinctions Derive from Moral Sense”, in R.B. Brandt, A Theory of Good and Right, (Oxford: Prometheus Books, 1979) p. 401
36. Ibid, p. 391.

Gandhi Marg, Volume 43, Number 4, January-March 2022.

* SARAL JHINGRAN, did her PhD on Advaita Vedanta from Rajasthan University in 1972. Since then she has held several UGC fellowships, and finally retired as a research scientist affiliated to Nehru Memorial Museum & Library. Her specializations are philosophy of Religion, Indian philosophy, and above all ethics. She is also involved in social issues, and upholds a secular humanitarian standpoint. | Email: saraljhingran@gmail.com