Revisiting A Theory of Justice through Gandhi

- By Prakash Khundrakpam* & Jayanta Krishna Sarmah#

Abstract

John Rawls and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi are two important political thinkers of contemporary times, who share a common concern for social justice. The paper revisits Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and the Razwls-Sen debate through a Gandhian notion of justice. The paper highlights that the two of them share distinct similarities in their accounts of justice. It then presents the argument for a more ‘complete’ understanding of justice using Gandhian epistemology based on fallibility, perfectibility, and the notion of half-truths versus the “Absolute truth’; in the form of the Sen-Gandhi-Rawls trinitas model.

Introduction

John Rawls (1921-2002) is one of the most discussed modern political theorists of the liberal tradition. Credited for single-handedly reviving political philosophy after its downfall, his A Theory of Justice¹ remains one of the most debated and discussed political writings of the century. It is a treasure trove; one enriched by later additive writings such as the publication of Political Liberalism² and the theoretical additions by Okin³ and Sen.⁴ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), also referred to as Bapu (meaning father) and the Mahatma (Great Soul), was an Indian lawyer, political practitioner and the architect of modern-day independent India.⁵ Driven by what he referred to as Satyagraha and its dual aspects of truth and non-violence, Gandhi showed utmost concern for social justice.

This paper revisits Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and the Rawls-Sen debate through a Gandhian notion of justice. The paper begins with a brief note on the method and process of inquiry adopted in this academic exercise. It then provides cursory summarizations of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and the Gandhian notion of justice. Having done so, the paper compares the Rawlsian idea of justice with the Gandhian notion of social justice to draw various similarities, while also noting deficiencies in the Rawlsian construct from a Gandhian vantage point.

Consequent to this comparison, the paper argues that it is possible to arrive at a holistic, more “complete” notion of justice by employing the Gandhian notion of justice and Gandhian epistemology based on fallibility and perfectibility of individuals; and the notion of half-truths versus the “Absolute Truth”; in the form of the Sen-Gandhi-Rawls Trinitas model. The paper proceeds to argue why such a holistic re-conceptualization of justice (and political philosophy in general) is needed.

A note on method

At the outset, it might erroneously seem a futile exercise to compare and contrast the ideas of Rawls and Gandhi. They lived during different times, in different places; and their actions and theories were shaped by the different events in their lives. However, the situation of a particular thinker at a particular point of time and/or space need not mean that he or she shares commonalities with the thinkers of that same point of time and/or space. Conversely, we find similarities between them. Kautilya’s Arthashastra⁶ and Machiavelli's The Prince⁷ presents such a case. Kautilya wrote in 4th century Mauryan India while Machiavelli wrote in 15th century Italy. Nonetheless, both of them present a very similar case of a pragmatic, realist tradition that justifies absolute monarchy and nullifies ethics and morality; to steady the troubled political conditions of their respective times. A similar case could be made for the heliocentric model of the solar system. Philolaus, Aristarchus of Samos, Nicholas Copernicus, and The Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata⁸ all presented arguments for a heliocentric model of the solar system, despite the separation by space and time.⁹

The article is thus exploratory: a plunge into the realm of the comparative unknowns. Nonetheless, the starting point of the validity of an academic exercise that engages in a revisit of Rawls’s theory of social justice and the resultant Rawls-Sen debate through a Gandhian idea of social justice could be premised on the fact that despite being situated in different historical epochs in political thought, their individual concerns of social justice was shaped by a common influence: religion. Only a few among the contemporary political scientists doubt that the Rawlsian theory of justice is uninfluenced by religious presuppositions.¹⁰ Recent developments have also heightened interest in the study of how much of an influence religion had on Rawls’ political philosophy and life. This includes the discovery of two texts; Rawls’ senior undergraduate thesis titled “A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community” and an absorbing essay titled “On my Religion” that Rawls wrote in 1976 but was never published.¹¹ Likewise, Gandhi was deeply guided by Hinduism and The Bible in his philosophical premises and thought.¹² Gandhi essentially held that politics is an integral part of religion and that the former is to be deeply guided by the latter, for they both require a “purity of conduct”¹³ Gandhi publicly declared, “I claim that at least my politics are not divorced from morality, from spirituality, from religion.¹⁴ For Gandhi, the root of his politics, thus, lies in the spiritual- in a quest for the meaning of the “Absolute Truth.”¹⁵

Pioneering work has been done in the context of comparing the political philosophies of Gandhi and Rawls, albeit not on the same topic of social justice that this article engages with. Haksar wrote about the similarities and dissimilarities of Gandhi’s and Rawls’ ideas on civil disobedience.¹⁶ Godrej’s work¹⁷ on using Gandhi's notion of non-violence as a method of arbitration of competing truth claims is also noteworthy. In the process, Godrej goes on to argue, quite convincingly, why such a Gandhian approach, using what she calls “the civic virtue of non-violence”¹⁸ is more useful than a contemporary Rawlsian approach in matters of adjudication or arbitration. This article seeks to build upon the tradition of such existing comparative studies of Gandhi and Rawls, their accounts of social justice, and most importantly the Gandhian notion that arbitration of morally conflicting truths is possible (and desirable).

The article employs Rawls’ theory as the skeletal framework and then counterpoises it against Gandhian ideas to draw similarities or dissimilarities. This methodology or nature of proceedings is adopted because the theory of normative justice that Rawls propounded is concrete and found in a single source; whereas, the Gandhian notion of justice (and other epistemological ideas) are found scattered across his works, practice, articles, and pamphlets. Rawls was a political theorist; Gandhi, a practitioner. Such an approach would thus be more pragmatic for this academic exercise. We thus start with a “comparative method;” by comparing and drawing similarities between the notions of justice of Rawls (and consequently Sen) and Gandhi. However, the “essence” of the approach that this paper adopts is decidedly Gandhian (and therefore of a relatively novel nature), in that it does not stop at the mere comparative description and consequent analysis of the thinkers in question; but argue towards the evolution of a holistic, notion of justice through the Gandhian idea of reconciliation and arbitration. To dub this paper as a work in the spectral realm of “comparative political theory” would thus be self-defeating, for it seeks to evolve and engage with a notion of justice in political theory (and philosophy) in its totality by not halting at mere comparative assessments. In addition, is the extant, wide discipline of “political theory ever not comparative”?¹⁹

Rawls’ Framework

Credited for single-handedly reviving Western (Anglo-American) political philosophy in the mid-20th century, John Rawls’ ideas on justice were first published in 1958 in his essay Justice as Fairness.²⁰ Although the central tenets of his theory were laid down here, it was not until the publication of the commanding treatise A Theory of Justice in 1971 that Rawls received both widespread academic attention and scrutiny. To begin, a brief recap of his theory is in order.

Rawls’ theory of justice, in essence, consists of three aspects: two principles of justice and ‘The Original Position,’ which is a hypothetical construct used as a method to compare and justify his principles of justice as being reasonable and ‘fair.’ The two principles are quoted:

1. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
• (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
• (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”²¹

Rawls argue that the aforementioned principles will be agreed to by everyone in the Original Position, a hypothetical construct, and remodeling of the social contract doctrine. The first principle is frequently referred to as the Equal Liberty Principle. Simply put, the first principle affirms that all citizens should have access to a basic set of rights and liberties. Rawls goes on to provide a crude list of such rights, mostly centered around basic political freedoms and what we would today refer to as “first-generation rights.”²² In providing such a list, Rawls necessitates a political constitution in which such a list of basic political rights and civil liberties would be entrenched. The second principle is often divided into two parts for the sake of discussion. The first part of the second principle 2(a) is called the Difference Principle and the second part of the second principle 2(b) is called the Fair Equality Principle. The First principle according to Rawls has lexical priority over the second principle. And also, the Fair Equality Principle has lexical priority over the Difference Principle. In addition, Rawls states that the two principles form a special conception of justice. It is not ahistorical in that it is applicable only in societies that have achieved a certain level of economic growth thereby allowing the exercise of certain liberties. Additionally, this special conception of justice is but a manifestation of a general conception of justice which states that ‘all social values are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all, is to everyone’s advantage.²³

One might ask a very simple question at this juncture. “So much for the principles but why must we accept these two principles of justice as the basis of organizing society?” According to Rawls, there are two arguments in favor of accepting these two principles. The first is that the principles appear reasonable in a modern setting wherein they imply policies and outcomes for individuals that match our thinking about these matters. The second is the thought experiment: the idea of the Original Position. Rawls opines that in the original position so constructed, which is a higher level of abstraction than the traditional social contract theory, the parties to it would choose a maximum outcome — an outcome that will make the worst possible outcome as good as possible; and this precisely makes the two principles of justice reasonable.

A Gandhian Notion of Justice²⁴

Gandhi never bothered to formulate a “theory” of justice as such in a concrete form, and hence it would be preposterous to write of one. Gandhi was not a political theorist but more of a practitioner. Any attempt to summarize Gandhi's ideas on the topic of justice into some sort of a principled theory is impractical because Gandhi understood justice as “not merely an epistemology... (but) in a deeply philosophical sense, an undertaking of being itself-an ontology.²⁵ Notwithstanding this encumbrance in studying Gandhi as a “theorist” of social justice, a certain notion of Gandhian justice can be still arrived at, based on his political epistemology and practice, for this paper, however limited it may be. As Gandhi did not formulate or propose a “theory” of justice, it would thus be more appropriate to talk of a “notion” of justice, an idea of justice that he developed in the course of his life and work; rooted in his political epistemology and Gandhian metaphysics.

“No man is an island”²⁶ and Gandhi is no exception. The Gandhian notion of justice is rooted in factors that shaped him as a political practitioner; the most prominent being religion and the realities of his time. Gandhi’s broad worldview, according to Rolland is thus based on a two-layered edifice consisting of a spiritual “crypt” and a super-structural “cathedral” of social and political action.²⁷ Realities that shaped the Gandhian notion of justice include but are not limited to his experiences of racism in South Africa, colonialism in India, and the resultant social co-morbidities that ravaged India during British rule. Western influences can also be identified in Gandhi's notion of justice; particularly the likes of Tolstoy, Ruskin, Thoreau, and the New Testament, most notably its Sermon on the Mount.²⁸ Such is the brief sketch of a Gandhian notion of justice; one that is deeply rooted in the spiritual but also molded by socio-economic and political realities. For Gandhi, every enterprise or human activity, and that would include a theoretical formulation of social justice, is to be guided by the search for the “Absolute Truth,” which can only be arrived at by “ceaseless striving.”²⁹ This Gandhian insistence that any human action (including that of conceptualization of theory and philosophy) needs to be guided by the “Absolute Truth” and his subsequent equation of Truth with God makes the influence of religion / spirituality in Gandhian political philosophy obvious and incontestable. Summing up, in a cavalier sense:

If (Gandhian) justice is the foundational norm of a society, then justice has to be grounded in some notion of the truth, which may possibly constitute a shared referral for political allegiance. Therefore, for Gandhi the concept of justice was inseparable from that of truth.³⁰

The Principles of Justice: Through a Gandhian lens

At the outset, regarding the First Principle, Gandhi echoes a stark similarity with Rawls’ concern for political equality and access to a set of basic liberties. He writes, ‘Every man has an equal right to the necessaries of life even as birds and beasts have.’³¹ One might argue that underlying his conviction of the idea of equality, is his concern for the untouchables in the Hindu society, who had been mistreated for a long time. Gandhi tirelessly undertook several campaigns to advocate equal rights and liberties for the untouchables, whom he referred to as antyaja (meaning last-born) and later as harijants (meaning children of God).³² However, there is much to the First Principle than what meets the eye, as we shall see later.

The Fair Equality Principle presents a more intriguing case. While Gandhi does recognize the idea of fair equality of opportunity, he is at best, “uninspired” by it. Gandhi delves deeper and recognizes other constraints on enjoying such apparent equality of opportunity. In an illuminating paragraph in Young India, he writes:

My idea of society is that while we are born equal, meaning that we have a right to equal opportunities, all have not the same capacity. It is, in the nature of things, impossible. For instance, all cannot have the same height, or color or degree of intelligence, etc.; therefore, in the nature of things, some will have ability to earn more and other less.”³³

Gandhi thus recognized decades before Sen that individuals have different capacities to absorb and transform their primary social good allotments to realize their potential. Sen (2009) argues along the same lines as Gandhi, using the capabilities approach, in one of the most cited and well-known critiques of Rawls’ theory of Justice. However, Gandhi differs from Sen in that his dissatisfaction with the idea of equality of opportunity forms the very reason for the need for redistribution, his desire to bring an ‘equalization of status'³⁴ and an idea of distributive justice rooted in just institutions. In Young India, Gandhi writes:

People with talents will have more, and they will utilize their talents for this purpose. If they utilize their talents kindly, they will be performing the work of the State. Such people exist as trustees, on no other terms. I would allow a man of intellect to earn more, I would not cramp his talent. But the bulk of his greater earnings must be used for the good of the State, just as the income of all earning sons of the father go to the common family fund. They would have their earning only as trustees.³⁵

This is particularly fascinating on two counts. First, the level of similarity Gandhi shows with that of Rawls is striking. Like Rawls, Gandhi shares a deep concern for distributive justice. Similar to Rawls, Gandhi's emphasis on ‘trusteeship’ shows his conviction of the role of just institutions in realizing justice for society.³⁶ In addition, while the arguments for Gandhi being an anarchist are somewhat established,³⁷ his acknowledgement here of the role of the state in the redistribution of money and by extension what Rawls calls ‘primary social goods'³⁸, is indicative of the fact that Gandhi would have approved of Rawls’ list of basic political rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Equal Liberty Principle (First Principle), albeit reluctantly. This is because Rawls assumed such rights and liberties to be embedded in a political constitution and that in turn requires a stable, well-established state. Why reluctantly? Because Gandhi would have criticized that Rawls stopped at “the political.” For Gandhi, ‘necessaries’ do not merely mean basic political rights and civil liberties but also social and economic rights. This draws from Gandhi’s abhorrence of the compartmentalization of “the human life” into separate realms of theory and praxis. According to him, “we needlessly divide life into water-tight compartments.”³⁹ For Gandhi, “Politics, economic progress etc., are not unconnected matters; knowing that they are all rooted in religion.”⁴⁰ Gandhi's list of basic necessaries to be guaranteed by the equal liberty principle would thus have included not only mere political rights and civil liberties but also socio-economic rights and the right against exploitation based on caste, creed, color, gender, and religion, just to name a few. Rawls’ list of basic political rights and civil liberties thus falls short of constituting or ensuring what Gandhi prescribed as “true politics” which he repeatedly distinguished from power politics.⁴¹ For Gandhi, “true politics” must “be looked upon in terms of social and moral progress,”⁴² and not merely in the strictly political sense, which is characteristic of the political practice in western liberal states. Raw/s’ list of basic political rights would thus ensure political participation and initiation of the individuals into what Gandhi called “power politics” but fall short to ensure what Gandhi termed as “true politics.” For Gandhi such social and moral progress would come through the Constructive Programme —a community-level project aimed at widespread social and political reform through a non-violent method, which engages various sections of the society.⁴³

The Rawls-Sen debate: A Gandhian Revisit of dual subjectivities

The Gandhian causal link, highlighted above, between the idea of equality of opportunity (and its deficiency of not accounting for capabilities of individuals) and the need for distributive justice, has profound implications for the Rawls-Sen debate on justice. Sen (1992) had argued, in one of the most significant critiques of Rawls’ theory that individuals have different capacities to absorb the allocated ry social goods and realize their potential. In other words, Sen criticized Rawls for focusing only on the means to achieve justice and for neglecting the ends; which he believes to be the enhancement of people’s capabilities. For this very reason, Sen opined that Rawls’ theory of justice which relies on just institutions (what he referred to as the Niti-centered approach) is at best partial and incomplete as it does not account for what happens to the people (what Sen calls the Nyaya-centered approach). Gandhi, however, has used the same aforementioned deficiency to argue for a case of redistribution on the same lines that Rawls did. The implications of the above Gandhian causal link on the Rawls-Sen debate on justice are discussed below.

But first, a clarificatory note is in order. Sen’s capabilities approach to justice has been subject to varying degrees or camps of acceptance by Rawlsian rejoinders and in general, other political theorists. Some view it as a very strong critique of Rawls’ theory and argue that Rawls’ theory fails apart on being subjected to Sen’s critique. Others are more forgiving and see it not as a critique or inimical to Rawls’ normative theory, but merely as a valuable addition to it. The above Gandhian causal link has repercussions for both subjectivities.

In the case of the first subjectivity (wherein we view Sen’s capabilities approach to justice as a humbling critique of Rawls’ theory of justice and the two theories as being inimical to each other), it is possible and even tempting to argue that Rawls was, in the prologue, aware of the difference in the capabilities of individuals; and with that knowledge, he sought to remedy it (the difference in the capabilities and consequent injustices) by providing for a just society using his principles of justice. Bluntly put, Rawls did not lament nor stress the difference in the capabilities of the individuals in an unjust society but simply sought to rectify it. Seen from this perspective, it is thus possible to argue that Rawls is more concerned (than Sen and other capability theorists) with the ‘ends of justice, it being a just society. Rawlsian rejoinders would be tempted to ask a moral question here, in the critique of Sen: Who is more concerned about ‘what actually happens to the people?’ Is it not Rawls, who attempts to right the wrongs by establishing a just society rather than Sen, who is more concerned about protesting that the capabilities of individuals in a pre-just society are being ignored to arrive at a just society? If the goal of politics is that of ‘a good life,’ is a better formulation not the one that arrives at it rather than the one that laments about the conditions of the prologue? Capability theorists can indeed counter this. It is possible to argue that even if Rawls did account for the difference in the capabilities of individuals in a pre-just society, it is never possible to arrive at such a just society from a pre-just society using Rawls’ principles of justice. The different capabilities of the individuals and conversion factors would successfully hinder the transformation of the unjust society into a just one. Seen from this perspective, Rawls’ just society seems a distant utopia at this point.

Rawlsian rejoinders can however respond by saying that institutional justice, manifest in the modern-day state, has enough prowess to oversee the transformation. The argument at this point would then center around the ability of the state to oversee the transformation from an unjust society to a just one. Note that this brings back us to the beginning of the argument where Sen criticized Rawls for focusing more on the means (the welfare state and other institutions) rather than on the ends of justice (enhancement of individual capabilities).

Rawlsian rejoinders and capability theorists can thus continue to argue along the same lines, in a cycle, with no resolution of sorts. At this point, it becomes a matter of personal philosophical choice to believe or choose a side of the argument. However, there are certain limitations in doing so. Godrej (2006) highlights that the problems in making such a choice of adoption of a competing notion of truth, in theory, or practice, are threefold. Firstly, how do we know our epistemological arguments are true? In other words, how do we know our version of theorization or practice is true and not erroneous if the truth is so multifaceted? Secondly, what do we do when these conflicting truths collide with each other? Lastly, how do we justify any sort of political practice or policy, say, for instance, a scheme of distributive justice, if the theory does not ride on the premise that it has arrived at some portion of the “Absolute Truth?”

The following limitations signal that arbitration capable of reconciling the conflicting ideas of justice is crucial for a holistic understanding of justice.⁴⁴ How do we arrive at such a resolution — one that would help us in establishing a theoretical formulation of justice that would enable or at the very least, aid us, in acquiring a holistic understanding of justice? Is it even possible to arrive at one at this point of the argument; or is justice fated to be a construct, a notion that is to be debated and contested endlessly, and not understood in totality? Is political philosophy in general to remain an arena wherein different contested accounts of a concept of idea collide but never settle down; for there is neither a method nor “a way of looking at things” that facilitates the settling down of an idea into a holistic totality of a construct? Is this not a case of the infamously ignored Ia face honteuse de la philosophie?⁴⁵

Feminist thought, particularly that of Le Doeuff, provides a useful insight to understand this particular problematic in political philosophy. Le Doeuff identifies in her work that despite feminist thought and philosophy sharing the most fundamental character, that of critical assessment and questioning of the environs to arrive at theories and consequent practices that would eventually lead to “a good life;” the development of a certain narrative, The Philosophical Imaginary, has placed the two at odds with each other. Among other manifestations of this narrative, she identifies that a particular masculinist style of writing characterized by an authoritative tone with a lack of receptivity and respect for the opponent's discourse has been normalized as original contributions in political philosophy while receptive works that take into account fallibility and gently respect for the opponent’s work have been sidelined as not philosophical interventions but mere “commentaries.” One might argue here that it is this very nature of “writing” philosophy that lends to it a very contested character. The lack of receptivity and non-acceptance of fallibility, conjoined with an authoritative style of writing philosophy and imposition of ideas has resulted in philosophy being a battlefield of fetal ideas; of half-truths, in a state of endless entropy and conflict, thereby making it impossible to understand philosophy as a “totality.” This makes it difficult for philosophy to arrive at a holistic understanding of any concept or idea; let it be equality, freedom, gender, or justice, for that matter. Holism in philosophy has traditionally been treated as an “Eastern” notion and has not been granted much importance. Au contraire, philosophical confusion based on dualities and multiplicities and also, the development of compartmentalized subjectivities of an “idea” have been encouraged- based on the formulation of an “idea,” critique and then consequent rejoinder groupism- with no or little efforts to arrive at a holistic understanding of an idea. For this way of writing philosophy makes “the vagueness of the concepts and the multiplicity of the criteria involved, aspects of the subject matter itself; and not of our inadequate methods of measurement nor incapacity for precise thought.”⁴⁶ Holism is a new entrant into the realm of philosophy and owes much to eastern thinkers such as Gandhi. We argue, before addressing the second subjectivity, that the Gandhian notion of “Absolute truth” and “competing truths” provide us with a way to address this “shameful face of philosophy;” and arrive at theories that are more “complete” than the extant theories with distinct, factional rejoinder cleavages.

Gandhi's notion of truth is based on the Advaita⁴⁷ branch of Hindu Vedanta philosophy which professes that transient realities do not have an existence of their own, but are only manifestations of the Brahman- the ultimate being that underlies all phenomena. Citing the example of seven blind men who offered differing accounts when they were told to describe an elephant through their sense of touch, Gandhi believed that there exist multiple accounts of “competing truths” in this reality, which are not wrong but are only partially true.⁴⁸ These half-truths are thus impartial truths of the “Absolute Truth” that can be arrived at through “ceaseless striving.”⁴⁹ However, Gandhi's stand on whether we could (and should strive to) actually arrive at the “Absolute truth” or rather arrive at a truth that is nearest to the “Absolute Truth,” during our brief human lives, is scandalously inconsistent.⁵⁰ The main reason for such an inconsistency in his notion of the possibility of the attainment of Absolute truth by human beings is because this conviction of the possibility of human perfectibility (which forms the basis for his notion of truth) is also inconsistent.⁵¹ Notwithstanding the inconsistency, this notion of truth helps arrive at a resolution of conflicting truth claims. Gandhi emphasized that the only way to arrive at a resolution of such conflicting claims is through non-violence.⁵² The problem however is that the notion of non-violence Gandhi espouses in these claims of resolution is “far too dependent on the stringent requirements of right living” and “intensive training of the conscience;” for a non-spiritual man or philosopher to adhere to.⁵³ This problematic is solved by Godrej, who establishes that we can utilize the notion of “Ahimsa as civic virtue” and not a creed, to excavate “a model of moral and political arbitration shorn of the Mahatma’s metaphysical framework,” which relies heavily on the assumptions of Hinduism. It is this notion of arbitration of morally competing for truth claims to arrive at the Absolute truth or at least a truth that is more “complete,” which assumes that humans are fallible but can be perfected; through ceaseless striving which uses non-violence, that makes the second subjectivity in this paper more “tempting,” holistic, coherent; and a necessity in the formulations of justice.

Now, the second subjectivity. In the context of the second subjectivity (wherein we view Sen’s arguments as an additive to Rawlsian ideas of justice and not inimical to it), it can be stated persuasively that the casual link that Gandhi so established between the difference in capabilities of individuals and the need for distributive justice through institutional mechanisms such as the modern-day state leads to a harmonious concept of justice linking Sen, Gandhi, and Rawls. This model of justice, which we would call, “The Sen-Gandhi-Rawls Trinitas model,” presents a holistic concept of justice, with the Gandhian causal link stated above serving as the missing link between the Rawlsian theory and the capabilities approach of Sen and others.

If Sen provided Rawls Theory of justice with a valuable addition to the capabilities approach, Gandhi's causal link filled in the glaring philosophical gap between the two.

The fact that the Gandhian causal link serves this purpose in an integrated theory of justice is appropriate in itself; for he was one of the few thinkers who rejected the sharp dichotomy between the means and ends.⁵⁴ In addition, as alluded to in the preceding sections, Gandhi subscribed to ‘organic holism’ which is a stance somewhere between strict individualism and a Vedantist pantheism wherein strict individualism is not well recognized.⁵⁵ Gandhi had always been a mediating, transitional, and median figure between philosophical extremes. The fact that he serves as a connection, a causal link between Rawls and Sen, is allegorically appropriate.

The Difference Principle revisited

The Difference Principle is where Rawls and Gandhi share a similarity, which is the easiest to identify. Rawls, idea of assigning the greatest benefits to the least advantaged is mirrored by Gandhi's Talisman.

Gandhi's talisman is one of the last notes left by Gandhi before his demise in 1948. The talisman is for a confused person in doubt who is unable to decide any further course of action. Gandhi advises the person to recall the face of the worst-off person and imagine if the work that is going to be undertaken will benefit the person and eventually lead to Swaraj (freedom) of the countless starving (literally and spiritually) millions. Gandhi believes that in the process, all doubts shall melt away and the person will be informed of what is to be done.⁵⁶ At the first glance, the similarity between the talisman and Rawls’ Difference Principle is evident. Additionally, implicit in Rawls’ Difference principle, is the assumption that the better endowed in a societal setting have a responsibility towards the worst off, to ensure that they have access to human needs and societal benefits. For Rawls, “q principle of paternalism is to guide decisions taken on behalf of others.”⁵⁷ In this regard, Rawls says that this situation is comparable to “trustees acting to promote the interests of the beneficiaries they represent.”⁵⁸ Such a conviction of the better off in society acting as trustees on behalf of the worst off is also shared by Gandhi. Gandhi believed that ensuring justice ans social benefits for the Harijans (and other worst-off groups in the society), necessitates a premediated duty on the part of the higher castes to consciously devote themselves to this cause. Gandhi's quest for “an equalization of status” (discussed in the preceding section on the Fair equality principle) is therefore guided by his belief in two supplementary actions, namely, the power of “forgiveness in action” or active forgiveness⁵⁹ on the part of the then victims of social discrimination (lower castes and Harijans) and actions of compensation to rectify past wrongs on the part of the past offenders (higher castes). It is worth mentioning here that “Gandhi was particularly known for advocating forgiveness as a key element of his theory of social change based on a relational worldview.”⁶⁰

Justice then for Gandhi is not merely distributive but also “restorative” in the quest for rectification of past injustices.

However, as stated above in the ‘necessaries argument’ (contained in the section on the Equal Liberty Principle), the definition of social ‘benefits’ might be radically different for Gandhi and Rawls. For Rawls, it is based on access to primary social goods. For Gandhi, it means much more than that and includes the idea of Swaraj (freedom) of the self in all spheres of life — whether it be political, economic, social, spiritual, or cultural. A Gandhian acolyte would thus view Rawls’ Difference Principle as a simplistic liberal restatement of Gandhi’s talisman, to be applied in the domain of political economy and the welfare state, and he would not be wrong in doing so.

Conclusion

The paper analyzed The Theory of Justice and the resultant Rawls-Sen debates on justice through the Gandhian idea of justice and a broad Gandhian epistemology. Comparative studies of the philosophies of Rawls and Gandhi are scarce despite similarities in their central concerns such as social justice and civil disobedience. What is however scarcer, are holistic works that attempt to arbitrate and reconcile conflicting accounts of an idea; works that attempt to bridge gaps and bring about the understanding of an idea in its philosophical totality. Rejoinder groupism and a resultant ensuing battle of conflicting ideas have invaded the realm of philosophy, with little regard or respect for the opponent's discourse.⁶¹ The paper seeks to incite thinking in such directions of holistic conceptualization of justice and political theory through Gandhi and other “ignored” thinkers as a medium or frame of reference.

Funding declaration

No funding was received for the conception / publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors have no potential conflict of interests to disclose with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Acknowledgements

Gratitude to Dr. Khundrakpam Devananda Singh and Miss Ronita Hijam, to whom the initial arguments of the paper were presented. Thanks to the reviewers for their valuable comments. Also, thanks to the Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, for the much-needed academic push to attain greater heights.

Notes and References:

1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).
2. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
3. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
4. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).
5. Gandhi's role in the process of the creation and establishment of the Indian nation-state is colossal. His leadership of the Indian freedom movement and how he led millions to independence is well known. For an account of how even his demise was useful for the Indian nation, see Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Why Bapu Matters”, The Indian Express, 29 January 2008, accessed on 14 October 2020.
6. Rudrapatna Shamasastry, Kautilya’s Arthasastra. Translated by Ra. Shamasastry. With an introductory note by J.F, Fleet, (Bangalore: The Government Press, 1915), accessed on 2 May 2020.
7. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Oxford World’s Classics), (New York: Oxford University Press, [1532] 2005)
8. Aryabhata and Walter Eugene Clark, The Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata: ‘An Ancient Indian Work on Mathematics and Astronomy', (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), accessed on 2 August 2020.
9. Owen Gingerich, “Did copernicus Owe a Debt to Aristarchus?” Journal for the History of Astronomy", 16, 1 (1985), p. 37.
10. See especially Rawls and Religion, ed. Tom Bailey and Valentina Gentile (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
11. See John Rawls, “A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith,” in A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: With ‘On My Religion,’ ed. Nagel Thomas, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 105-277. Also see John Rawls, “On my Religion,” in A Brief Inquiry, ed. Nagel Thomas, pp. 259-269.
12. For more on the influence of religion (spirituality) on Gandhi's political philosophy, see Raghavan lyer, “Chapter 3: The Purification of Politics” in The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, Oxford University Press, [1973] 2000); Bhikhu Parekh, “Chapter 3: Philosophy of Religion” & “Chapter 4: Spirituality, Politics and the Reinterpretation of Hinduism” in Gandhi’s Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination (London: Palgrave MacMillan, [1989] 1991) and last but not the least; Anthony Parel, “Introduction,” in Gandhi, Freedom and Self Rule, ed. Parel, (Maryland, USA Lexington Books, 2000).
13. Mohandas K. Gandhi, “A Letter,” in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi: Volumes 1 to 98 (Electronic Book), (hereafter CWMG), (New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1999), pp. 96, 74.
14. Gandhi, “Speech at Guildhouse Circuit,” in CWMG, 53, p. 396.
15. The notion of “Absolute Truth” in Gandhian Philosphy is elaborated and discussed in subsequent, relevant sections of the paper.
16. Vinit Haksar, “Rawls and Gandhi on civil disobedience”, Inquiry, 19, 1-4(1976), pp. 151-166.
17. Farah Godrej, “Nonviolence and Gandhi’s Truth: A Method for Moral and Political Arbitration”, (hereafter NGT: AMMPA), The Review of Politics, 68, 2 (2006), pp. 287-317.
18. Godrej, 2006, op.cit., p. 307.
19. Andrew E. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?” The Review of Politics, 71, 4, p. 536.
20. John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, The Philosophical Review, 67, 2 (1958), pp. 164-194.
21. Rawls, 2005, op.cit,, p. 302.
22. Karel Vasak, “Human rights: A thirty-year struggle: the sustained efforts to give force of law to the universal declaration of human rights,” The UNESCO Courier: A window open on the world, 30, 11 (1977), pp. 28-29, 32.
23. Rawls, 2005, op.cit,, p. 62.
24. In this section, we do not claim to espouse a concrete theory of justice based on Gandhi’s political philosophy. We seek to only provide a certain cursory peek into the notion of “Gandhian Justice,” for the sake of the arguments that are to follow. Other Gandhian epistemological takes on ideas such as Absolute Truth, equality, perfectibility, etc. that are of relevance to this paper, are presented along the course of the paper. For more on Gandhi's political epistemology and metaphysics, see, among others: Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi; Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy; and Joan Bondurant, Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict, (Princeton University Press, [1958] 1988).
25. Raymond B. Marcin, “Gandhi and Justice,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, 7, 3 (2004), pp. 17-30, https://doi.org/10.1353/log. 2004.0029.
26. John Donne, No Man is an Island, accessed on 21 October 2020.
27. “It is into depths of the crypt that he descends every day to seek inspiration and strength to carry on the work above.” Romain Rolland, Mahatma Gandhi, (New York: The Century Co., 1924), pp. 26-27.
28. J. Prasant Palakkappillil, “The Gandhian Concept of Social Justice”, in Routledge International Handbook of Social Justice, ed. Michael Reisch, (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 39.
29. “Truth is God”, Mohandas K. Gandhi, An Autobiography or The Story of my Experiments with Truth (Electronic Book), Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927), p. 4, https://www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/pdf-books/my-experiment-with-truth.pdf, accessed on 27 October 2020. For more on how Gandhi relates truth with God and the evolution of this narrative from “God is Truth” to “Truth is God,” also see Mohandas K. Gandhi, Truth is God: Gleanings from the writings of Mahatma Gandhi bearing on God, God-realization and the Godly Way (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Mudranalaya, 1955), accessed on 27 October 2020.
30. Neera Chandhoke, “Quest for Justice- The Gandhian Perspective,” Economic and Political Weekly, 33, 18 (2008), p. 40.
31. Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Can you avoid Class War?” Young India, 13, 13 (1931), p. 49.
32. Ramachandra Guha, "The Rise and fall of the term ‘Harijan’” The Telegraph, 10 June 2017, accessed on 28 October 2020.
33. Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Position of Privileged Classes,” Young India, 13, 48 (1931), p. 368.
34. Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Make of every Pupil a Whole Man,” Harijan, 5, 48 (1938), p. 416.
35. Gandhi, 1931, op.cit., p. 368.
36. As noted in the preceding section, a profound influence of religion on both Gandhi and Rawls could be the reason for their optimism in just institutions.
37. For arguments on Gandhi being an anarchist, see Dennis Dalton, “Gandhi: Ideology and authority,” Modern Asian Studies, 3, 4 (2008), pp. 382-383. hitps://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00002808 and George Woodcock, “Prologue,” in Anarchism: A History of Libertarian ideas and Movements, (Ohio: The World Publishing Company, 1962), p. 2, accessed on 10 June 2020
38. His acknowledgement of the need of the state, in general.
39. Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Letter to Horace Alexander,” in CWMG, 42, p. 160.
40. Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Talk with an American Journalist,” in CWMG, 92, p. 230.
41. Godrej, 2006, op.cit,, p. 292.
42. Gandhi, “Talk with an American Journalist,” in CWMG, 92, p. 230.
43. For more on the Constructive Programme, see Mohandas K. Gandhi, Constructive Programme Its Meaning and Place, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1941).
44. The same could be said of any other notion or idea in philosophy; for if we go by Gandhi, extant ideas in life and this includes political philosophy and practice, are mere half-truths, and not “complete” constructs that have arrived at an understanding of the Absolute Truth.
45. Literally meaning “The shameful face of philosophy.” See Michele le Doeuff, “Preface,” in Recherches sur l'imaginaire philosophique, (Paris: Payot, 1980).
46. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concept of Liberty,” in Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 177.
47. Translated, in most cases as “non-dualism.” But a more apt translation would be “non-secondness.”
48. “The Truth was beyond all seven.” Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Letter to Mrs. R. Armstrong and Mrs. PR. Howard,” in CWMG, 36, p. 14. Also, “What may appear as truth to one person might appear as untruth to another.” Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Letter to Narandas Gandhi,” in CWMG, 49, p. 384.
49. “What appear to be the different truths are like the countless and apparently different leaves of the same tree.” Gandhi, in CWMG, 49, p. 384.
50. Gandhi, on one hand, writes, “We must therefore be content with believing the truth as it appears to us,” Gandhi, in CWMG, 36, p. 14; “Finite human being(s) shall never know in its fullness Truth and Love which is in itself infinite,” Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Truth is One,” in CWMG, 38, p. 297; and, “But it is impossible for us to realize perfect truth so long as we are imprisoned in this mortal frame,” Gandhi, in CWMG, 49, p. 407. On the other hand, he writes, “He who strives... will have his whole being filled with truth,” Mohandas K. Gandhi, “What is Truth?” in CWMG, 25, p. 137; and also, “One can realize Truth and Ahimsa only by ceaseless striving.” CWMG, 49, p. 407. While this may seem conflicting to readers of Western philosophy, this Gandhian stance is neither new nor original Gandhi seems to have adopted a notion that human beings need to transcend certain worldly limitations and bindings to arrive at the “Absolute Truth,” a concept inherent in the Bodhisattva tradition of Buddhism.
51. Gandhi writes, ’To say that perfection is not attainable on this earth is to deny God.” Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Letter to Esther Faering,” in CWMG, 16, p. 203. Conversely, he also held that, “Not one of us is perfect. Not one of us is able to realize the whole of our spiritual ambition.” Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Letter to K. Santanam,” in CWMG, 35, p. 212. Simply put, “The Gandhian search for truth required the seeker’s unreserved faith in the existence of absolute truth, while on the other, it also gave a strong nod of approval to the skeptic’s position regarding the difficulty of ever grasping satya (truth) in its fullness,” Manfred B. Steger, Gandhi’s Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 116.
52. “Nonviolence can provide a solution to the moral and political dilemmas,” Godrej, 2006, op.cit., p. 294.
53. Ibid., pp. 298-299.
54. As stated above, capability theorists including Sen are considered to be more concerned about the ultimate ends (capabilities). Rawls’ normative theory is considered to be more concerned about the means of achieving justice, provided the argument for Rawls being more concerned (than Sen) presented in the same paper is set aside. Doing so does not lead to inconsistencies nor is the work subject to tuquoque (fallacy of hypocrisy), for the subjectivities are to be considered as mutually exclusive. If one embraces the first subjectivity, one does not consider the trinitas model. In such a case, the argument that Rawls is more ends oriented than Sen holds. If one instead embraces the second subjectivity, one does not consider the first subjectivity and the argument that Rawls is less ends oriented than Sen holds.
55. Nicholas F. Gier, The Virtue of Nonviolence: From Gautama to Gandhi, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 42. For Rawls, the subject of justice was the structure of the society and not separate individuals. Sen, on the other hand focused more on the individual capabilities of humans. The paper therefore argues that Sen professed a stronger individualism than Rawls, who despite being a liberal showed sympathy for liberal socialism. For similar arguments on John Rawls’ lean towards socialism, see William A. Edmundson, John Rawls: Reticent Socialist, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316779934. Gandhi’s organic holism could then be placed somewhere in between the fierce individualism of Sen and comparatively milder version of Rawls.
56. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase: Vol. 2, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1958), p. 65.
57. Rawls, 2005, op.cit,, p. 209.
58. Samuel freeman, “Original Position,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 27 February 1996, accessed on 15 January 2022.
59. Hunter Alan and Andrew Rigby, “Gandhi and the Virtue of Forgiveness,” Gandhi Marg, 12, 4 (January-March 2009), p. 437.
60. John S Moolakkattu, “Remorse and Forgiveness: A Contemporary Political Discussion,” Journal of Social Sciences, 26, 1, (2017), p. 17.
61. For a visual representation of such a particularly disturbing “battle” of ideas, with faction-based cheers and jeers, sce Jordan B Petersen, “Marxism: Zizek/Peterson: Official Video,” YouTube, 15 May 2019, hitps:/fwww youtube.com/watch?0=IsWndfzuOc4, accessed on 19 June 2021.

Courtesy: Gandhi Marg, Volume 43, Number 3, October-December 2021.

* Prakash Khundrakpam is a UGC NET-JRF Doctoral Fellow at Department of Political Sciences, Gauhati University, Guwahati Assam, India, 781014. Currently in the initial stage of his doctoral program, he is exploring his interests in political theory, Gandhian thought and public governance. Email: prakash.kh305@gmail.com